Last fall, Moldovan investigative journalists Natalia Zaharescu and Măriuța Nistor infiltrated the network of pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Șor for three months. They documented the illegal techniques used to mobilize people and the risks faced by journalists working in this context.
It is a warm August morning when Natalia Zaharescu shows me into the office of Ziarul de Gardă, an investigative newspaper founded in 2004. Parliamentary elections will be held at the end of September, and Moscow-funded groups continue to threaten voting freedom. The police, intelligence agencies, media, and civil society appear ready to address these threats. Chief among them are Natalia Zaharescu and Măriuța Nistor, investigative journalists and authors of “In the Service of Moscow” (parts 1 and 2 ), an undercover investigation to uncover the methods and extent of the network of collaborators of oligarch and former Moldovan politician Ilan Șor. In their report, which earned them the 2025 European Press Prize, the journalists demonstrated how the Russian network facilitated vote-buying during the presidential elections and the referendum on European integration, held in Moldova in October and November 2024.
Do you believe the risk remains high ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections?
M.N.: Through the Eurasia Association, certain social groups continue to be manipulated and subjected to fabricated propaganda from Moscow. Șor infiltrates people into various parties because his goal is to provide Moscow with as many people as possible in Parliament who can influence Moldovan politics. We are monitoring, and investigations will certainly follow if we have evidence to prove the exact identity of Șor’s men who infiltrated the candidate lists.
N.Z.: What we can say with certainty is what we learned while undercover. The presidential candidates with ties to Șor were Vasile Tarlev and Victoria Fortuna. My opinion is that the Kremlin and Șor have different ties and have different candidates to suit different tastes.
What threats do journalists face in Moldova today?
N.Z.: I believe journalists in Moldova are safe. There are some difficulties in terms of access to information, especially when institutions don’t allow it. Furthermore, politicians prefer to attack journalists rather than answer questions. In general, there is a tendency to denigrate our newspaper, especially online. We also experienced pressure and threats in public places during protests organized by Șor.
M.N.: Journalists in Moldova face various threats: from online harassment to insults from alleged politicians, to physical attacks. Recently, online harassment of journalists aimed at discrediting them has intensified. The same goes for physical attacks on journalists covering various protests organized by people close to Șor, who are paid to protest.
Have you or your newspaper ever been pressured by politicians or businessmen (oligarchs)? If so, in what context?
N.Z.: I’ve had the opportunity to address politicians a couple of times, and they’ve preferred to attack my newspaper rather than answer my questions. This happened with the former governor of Gagauzia and leader of the Heart of Moldova party, Irina Vlah. In that incident, people from her party, who we previously knew were affiliated with Șor, surrounded me and filmed me from all sides, claiming that Ziarul de Gardă is funded by USAID. This video was later posted on social media. More recently, Victoria Furtună, leader of the nationalist Greater Moldova Party, who, like Vlah, began claiming that I represented PAS (Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity) and Soros, and that Ziarul de Gardă is advertising for USAID. There has been some pressure online on Ziarul de Gardă, particularly in some Telegram groups. However, all of the newspaper’s funding is transparent and accessible to everyone on our website.
M.N.: Yes, the editorial staff of Ziarul de Gardă has been a constant target of politicians and oligarchs, whom we have investigated. I can only speak about the most recent cases, as I have only been part of the editorial staff for two years. After the publication of the investigation “In the Service of Moscow,” the editor of Ziarul de Gardă and her family were attacked by a smear campaign. At the same time, several politicians Ziarul de Gardă has written about have made unfounded accusations, thrown unjustifiable labels to discourage us from doing our job.
“In the Service of Moscow” is not the only case in which you infiltrated an Ilan Șor protest. How did you come up with the idea of a longer infiltration in 2024?
N.Z.: After 2022, I was able to prove that the participants in the Șor protests were paid. His men organized these protests in front of the courts when anyone was present, as happened on August 4th to Marina Tauber, a member of Parliament from the Șor party. We were able to prove that the protests are well-organized and paid, even with monthly stipends. This was already happening before the presidential elections, and Măriuța was able to infiltrate them for a few months, but we decided I should too. We were able to meet their presidential candidates and demonstrate that they wanted to ensure the “no” vote wins in the referendum. We were also able to follow their work during the second round of the elections.
M.N.: Our hypothesis was that the practice of organizing paid protests, which we observed in 2022, had never stopped, especially since, after President Sandu announced a referendum on European integration in December 2023, the protests organized by Șor’s group intensified. We therefore decided to test this hypothesis, but we discovered something even more serious: people were being retained with monthly stipends, not just protest payments. I don’t know whether it’s easy or not to infiltrate the group because it wasn’t easy last year either: it was a stroke of luck mixed with intuition and a lot of determination.
Watching “In the Service of Moscow,” one gets the feeling that the problem isn’t so much misinformation as economic motivation. How aware are these citizens?
M.N.: The problems are diverse, not just misinformation or financial issues. First of all, this pyramid has a very clear structure and could be a case study on the theme of loyalty within a group. Șor’s group exploits people’s vulnerabilities. It’s mostly made up of elderly people nostalgic for the Soviet Union and the Russian world, and Șor fuels this nostalgia with propaganda. These people are financially vulnerable, and Șor provides them with financial support. They need attention, and Șor often calls them to thank them for taking part in the team’s activities and invites them to protests and other rallies.
“In the Service of Moscow” is about crime, but also economic inequality. Those recruited by Șor are among the most vulnerable. Do you think the government has addressed/will address this problem?
N.Z.: I think they focused more on sanctions against those who participated in the protests. They fined 37,000 lei [about €1,890], which is a lot for such vulnerable people. They probably should have improved the living conditions of these people over time, and they could have communicated much better. They victimized people instead of improving their conditions. Other politicians promise to cancel these fines. Yet, I don’t understand why these people don’t ask themselves: why is another country paying you?
M.N.: Successive governments are 50% responsible for what happened, especially with regards to the 2024 elections. Why? Because they stole from the country – if you remember the infamous theft of a billion dollars, for which citizens are still paying today, the main reason it’s difficult to increase pensions and salaries. Because they allowed the rise of politicians with ties to Moscow, through whom the Russian Federation operates in Moldova. Yes, the Russian Federation would not have been able to do the same if the situation in Moldova, including the economy, had been better.
Were you able to follow what happened to these influence groups after November 2024?
V.Z.: To answer your question, we follow what happens in the public sphere, but also what happens outside of it. Generally, Moscow has invested too much in the creation of these groups to abandon them now.
M.N.: I don’t know what’s happening to the group I was part of, but I know what Șor’s network is doing: they continue to organize protests and destabilization in the country.
I’ve heard about new payments via a link in a Telegram chat and by registering on a specific platform.
N.Z.: Yes, as we’ve shown. The police announced it on August 4th. There’s a platform called TAITO, where you enter your personal data and documents and receive what are likely cryptocurrency payments.
What level of organization do you think exists within these groups? Could one advance their careers and participate in more complex plans? This includes the creation of false narratives to undermine pro-European candidates.
M.N: False narratives aren’t created by ordinary members; they arrive packaged from Moscow, where strategy and future plans are discussed in detail. However, I was offered the role of president of a major organization, which would have represented a promotion.
This publication is the result of activities carried out within the framework of the Media Freedom Rapid Response and the Media Advocacy Action for Moldova: Empowering Moldova’s Public Watchdogs to Safeguard Media Freedom project, co-financed by the CEI Fund of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), with the contribution of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The views expressed in these materials are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the co-funding institutions.